The election of Sharon, after Barak failed to crush the Intifada, reflects the rightward, religious shift of the Israeli society, once embodied by Netanyahu, who, despite increasing his government's oppressive measures, also failed to end to the resistance movement. Sharon, the latest King of the Israel, has attempted to avoid the mistakes of Netanyahu by forging a national unity coalition, which the Labor Party has accepted, resulting in the strongest government since the establishment of the State of Israel. Sharon triumphed in the elections most of all due to his promise to crush the Intifada within a hundred days, ostensibly to bring security to the citizens of Israel. Despite his differences with the Labor Party, and the deteriorating social and economic situation within Israel, Sharon has managed to keep the national unity government fully debriefed in its overriding quest to defeat the Intifada. The differences between him and Barak became irrelevant or "not that big," as Eli Goldschmidt, the publicity head of Barak's campaign, stated on 2 December 2001 to the Guardian. And a role was given to Shimon Peres: to whitewash Israel.

Although Sharon is leading the strongest government yet, he is trapped within it. He won the votes of his extreme, right wing followers by promising that the "Land of Israel" would not be partitioned. For the Labor Party and for a person like Shimon Peres, this was not an intrinsically controversial stance, despite that forfeiting some land is consistent with the Labor Party program.

Sharon and Shimon Peres continued the same policy of confiscating Palestinian land, building settlements, and never reaching an agreement. Again the Labor Party did not envision any controversy, as it too, from the era of Barak to that of Shimon Peres, had failed to reach or seriously pursue an agreement. As Palestinian resistance continues against the Israeli occupation, and as Sharon refuses to accept that the only solution is to end the occupation, he still struggles to reverse the wheels of progress, based on his conviction that Palestinians have no rights in Palestine. All his efforts thus far have not brought him any closer to the objectives of peace and security that he set before the Israeli public. Today the security of the Israeli public is at its lowest point, and the economy is deteriorating, without the government proposing any viable remedy. The heroic resistance movement being waged by Palestinians, even at the cost of martyrdom, has defeated Sharon's military operations and exposed as hollow his pledge to usher in an era of security and peace. The Israeli public is raising questions that Sharon is unable to answer. The interview Sharon gave to the Israeli TV Channel One in January 2002, offers poignant testimony to his apathy and the public's unrest. Inconsistencies and confrontations inside Israeli society as well as within the Israeli government are also reaching a dangerous simmer. Unrest has spread from injured and disabled Israelis to Israeli farmers to tourist branch workers and beyond. Meanwhile, there have been recurrent conflicts between Sharon and Peres, as well as between Sharon and Burg, the head of the Israeli Knesset.

Most encouraging is that an increasing number of Israeli soldiers, presently about 250, are refusing to serve in the occupied territories. Sharon's options involve the following question. If the Palestinians will accept seven apples out of a hundred, why should the Israelis offer them even that many? By increasing pressure on the Palestinians, Sharon perhaps assumes that they would accept as few as three apples, for example. And not necessarily three good apples!
From this point of view we can analyze Sharon's options.

First: Reoccupation of the autonomous areas.
Sharon and the Likud Party never have been fond of a partition or ceding land to the Palestinians. The separation model is an idea of the Labor government. Sharon believes that Israel can keep all the land and at the same time control the Palestinians. (If the Palestinians do not like this, he reasons, then they can leave.) This option recalls the situation before Oslo, which remains unacceptable to the world community and at the same time threatens to confront Israel with responsibilities for thee million additional civilians.

Furthermore, this situation would bring soldiers into the midst of Palestinians, likely causing increased friction and loss of Israeli life. This cannot be viewed as an acceptable solution, much less as an ideal. Also it is not a course supported by the Israeli public, a recent poll having found 58 percent of it opposed to a reoccupation and 38 percent in favor.

Second: Continue the siege-and-assassination policy, destroying the infrastructure and Palestinian economy.
A majority of the Israeli public seems to support this option, although more voices of protest are rising against it, taking heed that the increasingly effective Palestinian resistance movement is wreaking sorrow upon average Israelis. Two days ago more than ten thousand Israelis demonstrated against Sharon's policy, in favor of ending the Israeli occupation. Former members of the Israeli government, such as Yossi Sarid from the Meretz Party, have declared openly that Israel must withdraw from the occupied territories, dismantle the settlements, and divide Jerusalem between the Palestinians and the Israelis. (Interestingly, during Labor Party governments, the Meretz Party refrained from taking this position.) So far, the Israeli government has made every attempt to destroy Palestine's infrastructure and hold its three million residents in captivity, including President Arafat. To date this policy has proven to be counterproductive. The Palestinian resistance movement is stronger than before, and, after years of being divided in the aftermath of Oslo, the people are uniting behind Arafat and the Palestinian Authority.

Third: Replacement of Arafat and the Authority
The unwillingness of the United States and Israel and the inexplicable hesitation of the European Union to promote democratic structures in Palestine has led to a so-called Catch 22. Holding village, council, and city elections was a public Palestinian demand that, unfortunately, has never been taken seriously not even when many Palestinians requested that the European Union make its support for the Palestinian Authority contingent upon these elections being held.

President Arafat, whether loved or hated, is an elected official who embodies legitimacy; it is appropriate that he is the only one who can sanction official agreements. Replacing Arafat cannot succeed, no matter who is chosen. The Palestinian society, though in transition, has a vibrancy found nowhere else in the Arab World or the Third World. The political parties as well as the Palestinian public are sufficiently responsible and mature to reject any imposed authority. As such, any imposed authority is doomed to failure, as is any authority that sanctions such an agreement. It is noteworthy that the European Union acknowledged and supported this fact at the foreign ministers' conference of in February 2002. It also called for new elections.

Fourth: Transfer and/or more massacres
In view of the attention of the international community on Palestine, this option is unrealistic to the point of being hazardous for Israel. It could be one final act committed by an angry Sharon before finally leaving the Palestinian territories, fully aware that no neighboring country would be ready to receive three million Palestinians.

Fifth: Palestine in Jordan
This Likud option, Sharon's most lovable vision, is as foolish as it is impractical. It clearly demonstrates Sharon's colonial mentality. Neither the people of Jordan nor the Palestinians themselves will consent to having it imposed upon them. As this option is impossible to implement, it would only fuel the fire that already has begun to rampage through the Middle East.

Sixth: Unilateral withdrawal
This option contradicts Sharon's promises to his public, and it also fails to address the interrelated questions of settlements, refugees, and Jerusalem. When Sharon declared his acceptance in principle of a Palestinian State, he made it clear that such a state would have to conform to standards dictated by Israel. (He also did not specify any borders.) The unilateral withdrawal as defined in Sharon's plan would only cement the existing situation and thus provoke another resistance movement.

Seventh: The Jordanian option
As discussed for years, a confederation could be established between Jordan and Palestine. However, both King Hussein and his son King Abdullah have flatly rejected the possibility of placing the Jordanian army, instead of the Israeli Army, in control of the Palestinians. This being so, Palestinian efforts will be more wisely directed elsewhere.

Eighth: Complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders, including Jerusalem.
Although an option for Israel, Sharon and the majority of the Israeli public are not considering it at present. Nevertheless, an increasing minority within Israel is recognizing that this option finally might break the cycle of violence and establish security for everyone involved. This option is gaining popularity among those Israelis who appreciate that any effective security solution must be based upon political justice.

Ninth: Regionalizing the conflict
This option has always been an emergency exit for Israel's problems. At the beginning of the Intifada, Former Prime Minister Barak threatened Lebanon and Syria to direct attention away from his more immediate, domestic concerns. Bill Clinton, aware that US interests lay in minimizing conflict, informed him that that it was the improper moment to risk expanding the conflict.

Now with President Bush in office in Washington eager to crusade against International terrorism, the United States has threatened Iraq and Iran and other allegedly "evil" powers with sustained wars. It is possible that Israel will take the same approach as its foreign sponsors. The success of that technique will depend on the ability of the invaded countries to strike back.

Sharon's policy of continuing the occupation with destructive techniques depends on the following elements:

1. Unconditional support from the United States;
2. European silence (recently broken);
3. Arab impotence;
4. Weakness in the ranks of Israeli opposition.

Sharon is convinced that the Palestinian people finally will surrender under the increasing pressure of the Israeli military and the continuous destruction of the economy and the Palestinian authority. It is of lesser importance for Sharon if the New Middle East of Shimon Peres is not realized. It is feasible for Sharon to survive the harm that the Palestinian resistance movement is inflicting upon the Israeli society. He is capable of absorbing blows and finally is unconcerned about international reactions, as long as he maintained US support.

The following questions remain unanswered. How long can Israeli society endure the Intifada? How long can the Israeli economy bear up given its neglect? How long can the Israeli tourism industry remain paralyzed? Can Sharon face the Israeli public and win the coming elections? Will he adopt a still more aggressive posture beforehand?

Sharon will not be able to impose a new authority on the Palestinian people. It simply lacks the necessary legitimacy. He will not be able to install a junta ala South America nor a Fascist regime ala Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy. These have no roots in Palestinian society and thus no hope for any constituency. There is every indication that the solution Sharon is trying to impose on the Palestinian people depends on both the power of Israel and the impotence of the Arab Countries.

Regardless of the course chosen by Israel, the resistance of the Palestinian people has proven more than equal to the challenges before it. The Palestinian people depend on their ability to sustain the pressure, to remain steadfast and to continue the resistance movement. It is an inspiring legacy that they have resisted successfully thus far and reveal no signs of losing their resolve as the Intifada escalates.

The boiling point is fast approaching, and the Palestinians have demonstrated their unwillingness to surrender to a vastly stronger enemy. Surrender, now or ever, is an alternative as unacceptable as the occupation itself. Any solution that does not address the repercussions of Israeli occupation and settlement will fail. In addition, the Israeli dilemma and the Palestinian catastrophe cannot be resolved through humanitarian bribes, such as anti-poverty programs, human rights campaigns, or love-thy-enemy festivals. Such courses have been followed before, in the post-Oslo years, and their failure was predictable.

The ability of the Palestinian people to pass the boiling point is connected to two factors: First, steadfastness against the Israeli oppression, an area in which the Palestinians have been very successful so far. Second, the provision of all ingredients necessary for remaining steadfast. These include unifying the Palestinians around the common objective of ending the Israeli occupation, halting the political arrests, to which Palestinian society is highly sensitive, and eradicating corruption and monopoly distribution.

No Palestinian accepts that the political parties that have struggled over the last fifty years should be regarded as "terrorist organizations," simply because their cause of liberation is anathema to the United States and its stepchild Israel. Accepting Zionist-imposed terminology would, as intended, defeat the Palestinian spirit. Confronting Palestinian problems, however, is a very necessary and positive task. For example, respecting the law, promoting education, securing basic health care, and respecting women are objectives that reaffirm the culture of resistance to the deceit that has reigned for seven years. All trends toward igniting religious differences and confrontations must be rejected immediately. Finally, the democratic and pluralistic features of Palestinian society should be protected, nurtured, and expanded.

In addition, our goals must be clarified and presented accurately before the world. The Palestinian cause is so intrinsically just that it does not require superficial phrases or misleading terms. The basis for it is that the Palestinians are waging a legitimate resistance movement against an illegal military occupation. Stronger relations should be maintained with the progressive Israeli forces that are attempting to assume responsibility for changing the inhumane system imposed by their government. Though currently all Arab governments appear to have succumbed to US hegemony, the Arab masses fully grasp the depth of the Palestinian problem and empathize with the Intifida.

Arab governments and their citizens have a responsibility to join together in demonstrating legitimacy for the Palestinian Authority. The countervailing Israeli attempt seeks to turn Palestinian leaders into Israeli pawns and thereby sabotage the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority internally. The current Intifada, however, makes clear that the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority are poised to overcome all adversity posed by Sharon and his government.

Nassar Ibrahim, Alternative Information Center
Dr. Majed Nassar, Health Work Committees
February 2002